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ABSTRACT
In April 2015, BitTorrent Inc. released their distributed peer-to-peer powered browser, Project Maelstrom,
into public beta. The browser facilitates a new alternative website distribution paradigm to the traditional
HTTP-based, client-server model. This decentralised web is powered by each of the visitors accessing each
Maelstrom hosted website. Each user shares their copy of the website;s source code and multimedia content
with new visitors. As a result, a Maelstrom hosted website cannot be taken offline by law enforcement or any
other parties. Due to this open distribution model, a number of interesting censorship, security and privacy
considerations are raised. This paper explores the application, its protocol, sharing Maelstrom content and its
new visitor powered “web-hosting” paradigm.
Keywords: Project Maelstrom, BitTorrent, Decentralised Web, Alternative Web, Browser Forensics
1. INTRODUCTION
Project Maelstrom was released as a private alpha in
December 2014 [Klinker, 2014] and as a public beta
in April 2015 [Klinker, 2015]. Its purpose is to pro-
vide a decentralised web ecosystem facilitating a new
parallel to the existing world wide web. Through this
decentralisation, users are free to create and share any
content they desire without the need for web hosting
providers or domain names, and can bypass any na-
tional or international censorship. The HTML docu-
ments, associated styling and scripting files, multime-
dia content, etc., are hosted by the website’s visitors,
and subsequently served to other visitors accessing
the site. The official BitTorrent blog celebrated its
arrival as:
Truly an Internet powered by people, one
that lowers barriers and denies gatekeepers
their grip on our future [Klinker, 2014].
While the topic of BitTorrent in the media seems
to predominantly coincide with a discussion on on-
line piracy [Choi and Perez, 2007], the protocol has
proven itself as a robust, low-cost, distributed alter-
native to the traditional client-server content distri-
bution model. From a forensic standpoint, the de-
centralised nature of BitTorrent based applications
can result in extended windows for evidence acqui-
sition [Scanlon et al., 2014]. Aside from facilitating
copyright infringement, a number of additional on-
line services have been developed using the protocol
including:
• File Synchronisation Service – BitTorrent Sync
is a cloudless alternative to the cloud-based,
multiple-device, file synchronisation services
such as Dropbox, OneDrive, iCloud, etc. [Scan-
lon et al., 2015]. With a standard BitTorrent
Sync install, users are not limited in the amount
of data they can share as there are no replicated
server-side limitations.
• Cost-Effective Commercial Content Distribution
– BitTorrent Inc. use the protocol to distribute
commercial multimedia content through their
“BitTorrent Bundle” offering. Large video game
creators and distribution companies, Blizzard
Entertainment and Valve have used the BitTor-
rent protocol to distribute installation files and
software patches to their users [Watters et al.,
2011]. The advantage for these companies is that
the protocol excels where the traditional client-
server model starts to fail; the more users, the
faster the average download speed.
1.1 Contribution of this Work
The contribution of this work can be summarised as:
• An overview and analysis of Project Maelstrom’s
functionality.
• An analysis of the forensic value of its installa-
tion and configuration files.
• An investigation of evidence left behind after
uninstallation and what knowledge be recovered.
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2. BACKGROUND READING
2.1 Peer-to-Peer Facilitated Web
Browsing
The deep web refers to layers of Internet services and
communication that is not readily accessible to most
users and is not crawlable by traditional search en-
gines. Unlike the regular Internet, there is not one set
of protocols or formats for the deep web, instead deep
web is a generic term used to describe Internet com-
munications that are managed using closed or some-
how restricted protocols. More recently however, the
term “deep web” has been made synonymous with
black-market sites such as “The Silk Road”, taken of-
fline by the FBI in 2013. While BitTorrent Inc. do
not claim that Project Maelstrom enhances privacy
or anonymises a user’s Internet traffic, many of the
competing decentralised deep web technologies focus
their efforts on precisely that.
2.1.1 The Freenet Project
The Freenet project is a peer based distributed In-
ternet alternative. Users connect to Freenet through
an installed application that uses multiple encrypted
connections to mask the identifying network informa-
tion and the data location. Freenet peers, or nodes,
store fragments of data in a distributed fashion. The
number of times a data item is replicated is depen-
dent on the demand for that data. More popular files
have more available sources resulting in better avail-
ability and faster access times for the requester. The
layered encryption of the connections provides an ef-
fective defence against network sniffing attacks and
also complicates network forensic analysis. Freenet,
by default, is deployed as an OpenNet service. On
OpenNet, it is possible to enumerate and connect to
all available nodes and perform traffic correlation to
trace back to the original requester [Roos et al., 2014].
2.1.2 Tor
Tor (The Onion Router) is a networking protocol de-
signed to provide anonymity while accessing both reg-
ular websites, and those hosted within the Tor net-
work. Initially, Tor provided random internal en-
crypted routes enabling anonymised regular website
access for its users. This was achieved through a min-
imum of three encrypted connections before exiting to
the regular Internet through an exit node.
A user can opt not to utilise an exit node and in-
stead browse content on services hosted within the
Tor network itself. These Tor websites are known as
Hidden Services (HS) and the identity and geoloca-
tion of the hosting server are obfuscated, in a similar
fashion to the website’s visitors. This anonymisation
would normally make any form of dependable routing
impossible as any DNS lookup would not be able to
report a static IP address for the service for the client
system to connect to. Instead, hidden services use a
distributed hash table (DHT) and a known service
advertising node to inform clients of their presence
and the path to the service provided.
Due to the reliance of the HS on DHT and directory
servers to perform the introductions for Tor users,
Biryukov et al. [2013] were able to demonstrate a de-
nial of service attack on a HS by impersonating the
directory servers. They were also able to crawl the
DHT to harvest Onion Identifiers over a period of two
days, resulting in an accurate index of the content of
the deep web contained within Tor. This approach
could be useful when attempting to stall a HS until
it can be properly identified.
2.1.3 I2P
The Invisible Internet Project (I2P) is often consid-
ered another anonymisation utility like TOR. How-
ever, its garlic routing protocol is intended to create
an alternative Internet. In this model, all traffic takes
place via unidirectional tunnels established out to a
resource which responds with its own, different, tun-
nelled return path. In this way all traffic to and from
a host is protected by a separate session based tunnel
that closely resembles that of TOR, but I2P was not
intended to allow access to sites or services outside
of the I2P network itself. In this regard, I2P more
closely resembles Tor Hidden Services. In I2P, the
traffic is encrypted end-to-end and the encryption in
either direction is handled separately [Zantout and
Haraty, 2011].
3. PROJECT MAELSTROM:
APPLICATION ANALYSIS
Project Maelstrom is built upon the open source ver-
sion of Google’s Chrome browser, Chromium, as can
be seen in Figure 1.
3.1 Installation
The version of Project Maelstrom analysed as part of
this paper has the following properties
File: Maelstrom.exe
Size: 36,971KB
MD5: d3b6560c997a37a1359721fdaa25925f
SHA1: 9de7c48e324b2ac9240ca168b7c2afd46bd1c799
Origin: download-lb.utorrent.com
version: 37.0.2.1
All testing was carried out on a virtual machine
running Windows 7 with 1GB ram and a thin provi-
sioned 60gb hard drive.
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Figure 1: Project Maelstrom Default Start Page
The Project Maelstrom installation process is in
two parts. The first part installs a browser based on
Chrome that acts as a user interface for the Mael-
strom network. The second is the BitTorrent Mael-
strom application that handles caching of torrents
and maintains connection to the distributed hash ta-
ble (dht).
Once executed, the Project Maelstrom installer
extracts the required installation files to a TEMP direc-
tory in \Users \<username> \Appdata. Chrome.7z
and setup.exe are stored in a directory created
at \Local\Maelstrom\Application\<version
number>\Installer.
All pre-defined URLs used during installation
are stored within settings files extracted from the
Chrome.7z package and IP addresses are resolved as
required through standard DNS queries. This allows
the source servers to change addresses without in-
validating older installation packages. The Project
Maelstrom specific URLs at the time of writing are:
https://s3-us-west-1.amazonaws.com,
router.bittorrent.com,
update.browser.bittorrent.com,
router.utorrent.com,
bench.utorrent.com,
tracker.openbittorrent.com,
tracker.publicbt.com, and
https://s3-us-east-1-elb.amazonaws.com.
The first URL contacted is router.bittorrent.com
which acts as a registration point for the client
and a way to initiate DHT participation.
update.browser.bittorrent.com runs a script
on connection which checks the version of the client
connecting and generates a redirect to download
the relevant update if applicable. The update
check is triggered when the local client sends a GET
/windows/latest.json request and, if an update is
required the response contains a URL http://
update.browser.bittorrent.com/windows/
<latestversionnumber>/mini_installer.exe.
This secondary installer silently deploys a new
folder alongside the original version with the new
version number and the preferences and path files
are updated accordingly.
As part of the installation procedure Project
Maelstrom installs the following executables to the
\Application\ directory:
maelstrom.exe (desktop shortcut target)
MD5: 44d2641129cc922c5bc3545db8c8cda7
chrome.native.torrent.exe(browser torrent manager)
MD5: 85871a540cd77a3c419658fbe21c682b
These executables are copies of files stored in the
<version> subfolder and any update will cause
the current files to be renamed with a prefix of
“old_” before being replaced with the later version.
The file VisualElementsManifest.xml contains ref-
erences to logos and other application images that
include the <version> number to indicate which is
the current active subfolder though unless manually
altered this will usually indicate the latest version in-
stalled.
The subfolder \Application\<version>\webui
contains the base files for displaying default
Chromium fonts, backgrounds, borders as well as
all the files necessary for the start page and the
index.html and images for the Project Maelstrom
“onboarding” homepage partly depicted in figure1
In addition to the Application folder
AppData\Local\Maelstrom\User Data\ is provi-
sioned to store user specific data including user pref-
erences, browser and torrent settings and browsing
history. The majority of files are stored in the
Default folder which contains a subset of the stan-
dard Chrome installation files in addition to files spe-
cific to Project Maelstrom. These will be covered in
section 3.3 with the other files of forensic value to an
investigator.
The second part of the installation involves the
deployment of the BitTorrent Maelstrom folder
in \Users \<username> \Appdata\Roaming\ to
handle all torrent and DHT related activities. Any
new torrents requested are saved here along with the
corresponding .resume file. Torrent content is stored
in the cache folder to speed up future access to to
act as a repository to be shared with other users.
On installation the root folder is used to store the files
8E65684D700ECC41A09A60EE58991845EA56F734.resume
8E65684D700ECC41A09A60EE58991845EA56F734.torrent
which are the torrent files associated with the Project
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Maelstrom Startpage.
3.2 Settings
Being built on Chromium, Project Maelstrom has
all of the same browsing options available to the
user. A standard installation has the same browser
defaults set as a standard Chrome installation.
One setting of interest is found in Settings >
Advanced Settings > System. The option to “con-
tinue running background apps when Maelstrom is
closed” is enabled by default. This will result
in the chrome.native.torrent.exe executable run-
ning and sharing cached website torrent data from
the users system without any visible indicator. In
testing the data rate was observed to maintain at an
average 800 bytes per second up and 800 bytes per
second down. This was most likely just DHT up-
dates and ping traffic. At any given time there were
approximately 50 concurrent connections recorded.
The Project Maelstrom specific settings can be
found in the “Torrent” section of the settings page.
Each settings is customisable but at the time of in-
stallation the defaults are:
• Cache Size – The amount of space available to
store cached torrent data is set to 5GB with a
warning not to exceed 100GB.
• Sharing Ratio – A slider can be used to change
the ratio from 0 upload to unlimited upload. The
default setting is upload data is equal to the
amount downloaded. This sharing ratio is mea-
sured on a per torrent basis and is presented to
the user as a measure of contribution.
• Rate Limits – The default setting is to not re-
strict upload or download speeds.
• Transfer Limit – The default setting is not to
impose a cap on total transfer amounts.
• Port Settings – A port is selected at installa-
tion as the static communication port. This port
number can be customised here or can be set to
be randomly selected.
• Proxy Server – The proxy settings for torrent
transfers can be selected from a dropdown list
including SOCKS which will allow for the use of
TOR for added anonymity. By default, no proxy
is selected.
• Privacy – By default the option to send anony-
mous crash data to BitTorrent Inc. is enabled.
3.3 Files of Forensic value
During the first run the settings and preferences files
stored in User Data and Application are popu-
lated. at the same time, the torrent specific set-
tings and discovery are recorded in the Roaming di-
rectory. Because of Project Maelstrom’s roots in
the Chromium browser, many of the same forensi-
cally important resources are present. However, the
dual nature of the utility does present some degree of
difference.For example, while the History tab shows
the bittorrent:// and magnet:// sites visited, the
content for these sites is not stored in the standard
caches or data files. Instead checking the output of
about:cache in the browser will only show standard
website files. All caching and management relating
to torrents are stored in the Roaming\BitTorrent
Maelstrom folder.
• Local\Maelstrom\Application – This direc-
tory contains initial setup files and content added
during installation. Of most use is confirmation
of an active installation, timestamps to indicate
install time and a record of the initial settings.
• Local\Maelstrom\User Data – contains the
majority of the user specific settings and activity
records. This folder and its subfolders can be ex-
amined using established forensic techniques for
use on Chrome browsers but also includes some
new files that may be of use.
1. The history SQLite3 database file stored
in the default folder will contain both
the magnet:? URI and the resolved
bittorrent:// address. The magnet:?
entry will have a title (same as the torrent
file), while the bittorrent:// address will
have the title of the index.html page con-
tained in the bundle.
2. Origin Bound Certs will only contain the
certificates specific to the normal internet
browsing activities.
3. The HTML rendered after scripts have
been run is stored in the Cache direc-
tory. for example, the full HTML of
bittorrent://welcome is stored as part of
f_000005.
4. Local Storage – contains persistent infor-
mation used by visited websites. From
the first run this will contain the Unique
ID used by bench.utorrent.com to gather
anonymous usage statistics. The contents
of this folder are SQLite3 databases with
individual data sets stored as blobs
5. Session Storage – contains a list of Bit-
Torrent UUIDs. The first UUID matches
that stored in the bench.utorrent local
storage file. The remainder are those of re-
mote peers the browser is in contact with.
• Roaming\BitTorrent Maelstrom\ Contains the
bulk of the torrent handling and storage elements
of Project Maelstrom. The root folder has many
items of forensic value including:
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1. <bt.infohash>.torrent – The torrent file
used to locate and download resources from
peers. This is a standard torrent file for-
mat listing all sub-files contained within the
“bundle” and the hashes for each piece and
the trackers.
2. <bt.infohash>.resume – A resume file cre-
ated to allow .torrent data processing to
be paused and continued without having to
restart to ensure full data transfer. The cre-
ation of the resume file could be used as a
guideline to when the related .torrent was
first processed.
3. dht.dat – This consists of a bencoded list of
observed IP:Port combinations of peers par-
ticipating in the DHT. The content starts
with the value id20:, which is followed by
the BitTorrent client’s unique ID on the
DHT network. It is then followed by the
number of observed nodes or peers and a
listing of the IP:Port pairs in 6 byte IPv4
representations.
4. settings.dat – This file contains the tor-
rent client settings and the usage statistics.
5. Cache – This stores the downloaded torrent
files, which correspond to the name of the
torrent appended with the btinfohash of
the piece. Scripts and web pages are loaded
and executed from this directory to improve
browsing speed for the user and to provide
a repository to share to other peers.
6. trusted folder – This stores the
bittorrent.crt file for use in peer
secure transfer negotiation.
3.4 Local File Remnants
While there is no dedicated uninstall executable for
Project Maelstrom, the registry key
HKCU\<user>\Software\Microsoft\Windows\
CurrentVersion\Uninstall\Maelstrom
UninstallString
shows the control panel remove program options to
be the equivalent of running
“AppData\Local\Maelstrom\Application\
<version> \Installer\setup.exe”
−−uninstall
By default the option to remove user history is not
checked. If left as default, all of the files and folders
in AppData\Local\Maelstrom\User Data\ is left
intact including any history and cookie folders as
well as user specific settings and preferences.
If the option to remove User history is se-
lected then the entire AppData\Local\Maelstrom\
folder and all subfolders are removed. However,
in either scenario the AppData\Roaming\BitTorrent
Maelstrom\ folder is left untouched along with all of
the subfolders and files contained therein including
dht.dat and any .torrent and .resume files that
may have been stored. Additionally all cached data
held in the cache directory is left intact and retriev-
able.
4. PROJECT MAELSTROM:
PROTOCOL ANALYSIS
4.1 Accessing a Website
Project Maelstrom supports all of the regular pro-
tocols that ship with Chromium, alongside two Bit-
Torrent ecosystem specific URIs; bittorrent:// and
magnet:?.
In order to load any given webpage, the browser
must:
1. Resolve the magnet link to a .torrent file.
2. Identify other peers currently serving that web-
page.
3. Identify any torrents contained within the web-
page bundle.
4. Cache part files and store them as blocks of the
whole in sequence.
5. Process any scripts that determine content.
6. Update the sharing status of the local content to
include the new webpage.
4.1.1 Peer Discovery
In order to discover an initial set of peers the client
contacts router.bittorrent.com. The packet re-
questing peers contains the command “find_nodes”
and is bencoded with the Local Peer ID followed
by the BitTorrent share ID. In response a ben-
coded list of registered peers is returned, each with
a 26 byte entry consisting of a 20 byte PeerID
and a 6 byte IP:Port entry. The local client then
uses DHT_Ping to discover live hosts and stan-
dard torrent discovery is performed as described in
the BitTorrent Extension Protocols (BEP) – specifi-
cally BEP005 deals with DHT discovery and boot-
strapping [Loewenstern and Norberg, 2008]. Any
peer that has the chrome.native.torrent.exe ex-
ecutable running, even if the Maelstrom browser is
shutdown, that has the torrent in its cache will be-
come available as valid content source.
4.1.2 Content Negotiation
Links in Project Maelstrom are handled either as tor-
rent files or as magnet:? links. If a magnet link
is followed the Maelstrom browser must first resolve
the data provided in the link to a valid torrent file.
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This is achieved either by looking up the tracker URL
included in the magnet link using the tr parame-
ter or one of the default trackers defined at installa-
tion. Once discovered the torrent ID is then used to
construct find_nodes requests that are sent to the
known DHT peers and router.bittorrent.com.
4.2 Maelstrom Development
The development of websites for distribution through
Maelstrom does not require any special consideration
during the development of the website content, i.e.,
the HTML, CSS, JavaScript, graphics, multimedia
content, etc. Where the traditional web development
process differs is with regards to the uploading of con-
tent to a web server. These websites can be delivered
either as a single large torrent resource broken into
pieces or, for ease of maintenance and to avoid users
having to re-download the entire site every time the
content is changed, as a series of .torrent files linked
by an encompassing “Bundle”.
To make the process more streamlined, BitTorrent
Inc. have developed a number of helper tools and
guidelines [BitTorrent Inc., 2015].
5. CONCLUSION
It is envisioned that the popularity of Project Mael-
strom (and similar decentralised alternatives) will in-
crease in the coming months and years due to its ease
of use, easy web-authoring and zero-cost model (to
content creators and consumers alike). Perhaps Bit-
Torrent Inc. will have the ability to raise their new
Internet from the deep web into the hands of regular
Internet users.
5.1 Future Work
With the browser just having been recently released
as a public beta, there remains much to be discov-
ered regarding the nuances of this decentralised web.
Some areas for future work include:
• Development of a tool capable of monitoring who
is accessing any specific Maelstrom-only website.
The decentralised nature of the protocol leaves it
vulnerable for third-parties to garner visitor in-
formation statistics that are normally reserved
for the administrator of the web host such as
location, access duration, files downloaded, fre-
quency of repeat visits, content available for
sharing, etc.
• Perform an analysis of ZeroNet [ZeroNet, 2015],
an open source Project Maelstrom alternative.
ZeroNet does not require the use of a specific
browser – instead running as a service on the
local machine.
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